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15. The striking success of the National Labor
Relations Act
Michael L. Wachter1

INTRODUCTION

In the United States today. less than I 0 percent of private sector employment is union
ized.2 After peaking a t 35 percent of employment in the early 1950s, union membership
has been in decline for the last 59 years. This decline represents one of the most impor
tant institutional shifts in the U n ited States economy. Reflecting this decline. a common
theme among academic legal commentators is that the law governing unionization and
collective bargaining, the National Labor Relations Act ( N L RA ) . has been a terrible
failure. In this chapter I will make the counter-claim- that the N LRA has been largely
successful and in one key area exceedingly successful. Its presumed failure, if the word
failure needs to be maintained, is largely due to its successes .
Before j udging the N LRA t o be a success or failure, measures of success have to be
identified. I will judge the success o f the N L RA by whether the two explicit goals of the
Wagner Act of 1935 have been achieved. The goals are i ndustrial peace and a greater
balance in bargaining power between employers and employees.
The first of the goals is indu strial peace. The preamble of the Wagner Act starts
by identifying that the "denial by some employers of the right of employees to orga
nize" and bargain collectively had led "to strikes and other forms of industrial strife
or unrest. "3 Industrial strife and unrest at the time o f the passage o f the Wagner
Act meant more than the inconvenient strikes that we sometimes experience today.
Instead, it meant violent strikes that paralyzed the national economy and frequently
required the deployment of the National Guard or federal troops to restore order.
Indeed, in the midst of the Great Depression the question was whether the then
prevail ing political economy would survive. Critical to the stability of the political
economy was adopting a legal regime for labor that would replace indust rial st rife
with industrial peace.
A second goal is to redress "inequality of bargaining power." I n the words of the
Act, "[t]he inequality of bargaining power . . . substantially burdens and affects the
flow of commerce. and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions. by depress
ing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in industr y and by preventing
the stabilization of competitive wage rates and working conditions within and between
industries."4 The goal was not true equality but rather giving employees meaningful
bargaining power .
T o evaluate the success o f the N LRA, I will treat it as one of four alternative legal
regimes, all or which have actually existed in the United States since the beginning of the
New Deal, and will ask which of the fo ur is most likely to achieve the two goals. In terms
of terminology. I no te that the N L RA has been amended several times since the original
427
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Act - the Wagner Act - was first passed in 1 93 5. When I use the term N L R A , I refer to
the labor law as it exists today.
The first of the alternative legal regimes is the National Industrial Recovery Act
( N I RA) of 1933. which was the first attempt in the U nited States to give workers the
right to act in concert without employer interference and to encourage collective bar
gaining. The second is the original N L R A - the Wagner Act - as passed in 1 935. The
third is today's N LRA, which includes the major Taft-Hartley Amendments of 1947.
The fourth legal regime is the patchwork of employment laws that regulate today's non
union sector.
It is also useful to think of these legal regimes as constituting alternative political
economies. Here the fou r legal regimes constitute three alternative political economies
since the NLRA of today and the non-union sector of today constitute a single political
economy. Since both the N I R A and the Wagner Act envisioned widespread unioniza
tion, I do not discuss the non-union sectors that co-existed when those laws were in
effect .
In addition, each of the four legal regimes corresponds with a distinct economic
model. The economic model of the N IRA was cartelization, where both wages and prices
were set collect ively with government oversight . The economic model of the Wagner
Act was also a cartelization model, but only of the labor market. I t was envisioned that
collective bargaining would become the primary vehicle for wage setting and would, i n
time. embrace most eligible workers. Hence, wages would be set by the dictates of the
collective bargaining process and not the dictates of the marketplace. Unions would have
monopoly power in the labor market, but firms would not have monopoly power in their
product markets.
The third legal regime is the modern N LRA, which includes the Taft-Hartley
Amendments. That legal regime envisioned that unionization would not spread through
out the economy and that non-union employers would emerge wit hin each industry t o
compete with unionized employers. The resulting model has a union sect o r where wages
are set by collective bargaining and a non-union sector where wages are set co mpetitively.
The fo urth legal regime is today's non-union secto r. The econo mic model that fits the
non-union sector is the competitive model. but with an important twist. Competition
operates in the external labor market (E L M ) where firms seek workers and workers seek
jobs. Wages overall are set competitively i n the E L M . However, afler being hired. an
employee works inside a firm, and the firm can be viewed as having its own internal labo r
market ( I L M). The lLM inside non-union firms i s a complex organizational structure
where norms rather than legal rules prevail.5 Importantly, the [ L M is not a textbook
competit ive model. In addition to the norms of the I L M , the employment relationhip is regulated by statutory rules that go vern the entire labor force, such as the Fair
Labor Standard Act ( F LSA), the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA ) and the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (E R ISA). These statutory regulations govern
both the union and the non-union labor market, but I discuss them as part of the non
union market.
The analysis below proceeds as follows: In section I, I analyze in depth the two goals o f
the NLRA: first, industrial peace and. second, equalization o f bargaining power. Since
the former emerges as the key of the two goals, section I I presents a history of the major
events whereby industrial strife was slowly replaced by industrial peace. The industrial
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strife of this period was marked by strikes of uncertain legal standing which often turned
violent. I n section IlL I present the four legal regimes, introduced above, describing their
main features and matching each with an economic model that captures the spirit of the
legal regime. In ection IV, I evaluate the success of the four legal regimes in achieving
the goals of industrial peace and equalization of bargaining power. Section V concludes
with the claim that today's N L RA can be judged to be s uccessful because of the sharp
decline in strike activity and related violence. In addition. per haps unexpectedly. the
non-union sector has become a vibrant part of the American economy. I argue that the
success of the non-union sector is partly a result of the incentives created by the N LRA,
which gives an escape valve for poorly treated non-union workers and a costly penalty to
non-union opportunistic employers.

I.

THE BROAD GOALS OF THE NLRA

A.

Industrial Peace

The preamble of the Wagner Act first lists the goal of reducing industrial strife. On one
leveL this goal means reducing the number of strikes or the economic effect s of strikes.
But that barely scratches the surface of this goal. Industrial strife in the late 1 9th and
early 20th centuries went far deeper, raising the question of whether the employees
would accept the basic rules of the game. For instance. would workers cooperate in a
political economy that did not provide for a legal l y protected right t o organize and to
strike? Would workers act to change the political system it self, whether lawfully or not.
if their key demands were not respected? Would the U n ited States electorate tolerate a
political economy that regularly needed to call on the National Guard or federal troops
to be deployed in American cities to break strikes. often using lethal force in the process?
Not only was industrial peace given top billing by the Act itself, i t was also specifi
cally cited as the basis for declaring the Act constitutional. I n Jones & Laughlin Steel
the Supreme Court spoke of the deleterious impact of industr ial strife on interstate
commerce, noting especially the immediate and potentially catastrophic effect s of a steel
strike on the economy.6
Prior to 1 932, there was no federal legal right to strike, even peacefully; and indeed
many strikes were illegal under state law or the federal common law followed in federal
courts. 7 Employers often required that workers agree not to join a union or be involved
in union activities during the term of their employment, and the federal courts held such
agreements binding. Concerted activity by employees was not protected. If workers went
out on strike and did not return to work when served w i th a state court ordered injunc
tion, the striking workers were in contempt of court.8 When confronted by police or
Pinkerton guards, strikes would often turn violent. The next move i n many strikes was
for the state governor to call out the National Guard to restore order.
In the Great Railroad Strike of 1 877 federal troops were deployed in six states in major
cities. including Balt imore, Pitt sburgh, Chicago and St. Louis. Striking workers often
resisted, resulting in consider able violence and many deaths. Certainly one could under 
stand President Rutherford Hayes' concer n that a revolution might be in the making
( B recher. 1 997: Zinn, 2003).9 Imagine that scene today playing out on television and the
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Internet. Industrial turmoil persisted well into the 20th century, as dem o nstrated below,
further underscoring the desire to achieve industrial peace.
Hence, when I use the term "industrial peace ·· to describe what Congress was seeking,
I am not only referring to a reduction in the number of work days lost from peaceful and
lawful work stoppages. My focus is - and Congress' focus was - on the unrest that Jed to
riots and to the eventual use of police o r military force t o restore order.
A legal regime was needed to legitimize both unionization and strikes, but also to steer
those activities into peaceful channels. I n this chapter I will focus on this first goal of
industrial peace because it was arguably the most important in terms of the workings of
the economic system.
B.

Equality

of Bargaining Power

A second goal of unions is to redress ·'inequality of bargaining power."1 0 Whereas the
goal of industrial peace is straightforward, the same is not t rue of the equality of bargain
ing power. Indeed. the goal is not only complex, but also based on a flawed theory of
economics, and, as a consequence, is internally inconsistent.
First, the goal is complex because it has both procedural and substantive elements.
On the procedural element, Senator Wagner himself said that the goal was satisfied
if workers were represented by unions. I will adopt Senator Wagner's interpretation
by equating the procedural element with workers' achievement of collective bargain
ing stat us. 1 1 This provides a clear and measurable goal. The greater the percentage of
workers belonging to unions and engaging i n collective bargaining. the more successful
is the Act . Hereafter, I use the term "union density" to denote the percentage of workers
who belong to unions.
The substantive element is raising wages. which it was hoped would reduce the likeli
hood or severity of depressions. The traditional indicator of whether unions raise wages
is the union wage premium, or the percentage difference between the union wage and the
non-union wage . 1 2 Collective bargaining and higher wages were linked . It was always
understood that the collectively bargained wage would be higher than the wage achieved
in the non-union sector.
At this point in the analysis the goal. albeit complex, can be cabined i n what appears
to be a consistent manner. Simply stated, the procedural goal is achieved when workers
join unions and engage in collective bargaining and the substantive goal is achieved when
the collectively bargained wage is set above otherwise-prevailing wages in an unorga
nized labor market. But that understanding of the second goal of the Act brings us to
a problem that is not easily resolved. The Wagner Act was passed in 1 93 7 , before the
development of the neoclassical model or economics and the modern theory of business
cycles. Fundamentally the secOI'ld goal of the Wagner Act was based on tlawed and now
outdated theories of wage determination and of business cycles.
The labor market analysis at the time of the Great Depression was still rooted in the
theories of Thomas Mal thus and John R . Commons. M althus claimed that population
growth would always leave a pool of unemployed workers that would keep wages at the
subsistence level ( Mal thus. 1 8 03 ). John R. Commons, one of the original giants of indus
trial relations. extended the claim. saying that "cutthroat competition·' among workers
set the market wage at the wage that the "cheapest laborer" would be willing to accept
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(Commons and Andrews. 1 9 2 7). T o remedy the problem. unions were needed to address
the inequality of bargaining power. 13
The modern concept of competitive labor markets was undeveloped at this time. It
was not until 1 93 2 that John Hicks published The Theory of Wages and laid the frame
work for the neoclassical theory of wage determination; and it was several decades later
before it became widely known or accepted ( H icks, 1 963). ln the modern theory of wage
determination, the competitive wage is the wage that eq uates supply and demand. Both
employers and employees are ''price takers:' · neither exercises bargaining power. The
competitive wage may be a depressed wage in terms of some norm of acceptable living
conditions. but it i the market outcome. But the conventional wisdom among policy
makers when labor law was being developed in the 1 930s was that of Commons and not
H icks.1�
The business cycle language of the Act creates problems as well i n light o f modern
neoclassical economic theory. The statutory language looks to unions to raise wages
to counter an ongoing deflationary cycle where declining wages result in under
consumpt ion and thus increased unemployment. The under-consumption story was
a neat one but t here was never any solid economic support for it, 15 and i t was in the
course or being replaced by Keynesian economics even as the Act \Vas passed. Keynesian
economics posited that a combination of fiscal and monetary policy could reduce the
severity or business cycles and maintain wages. That theory has been applied with con
siderable success ever since.
Today's economics textbooks do not refer to "' under-consumption" and there is no
business cycle theory that u t ilizes it. Mark Barenberg (1993) investigated the under
consumption story and confi rmed these conclusions; he referred to under-consumption
,.
as part '·of the popular 'new economics,· but it was the new economics of the 1 920s.
C.

What Do We Make of the Two Goals?

Two alternative stories can be told in putting these two goals together. The first story is
the one told by the framers of the Wagner Act. Industrial peace is an important. clear,
and coherent goal of the Wagner Act. Moving from a regime of violent strikes and
industrial strife to one of industrial peace is an extraordinarily important goal, if it can
be achieved. Replacing industrial strife and unrest with industrial peace makes both
employers and employees better off, and has enormous benefits for social welfare. On
the other hand, a violent regime of illegal strikes, riots and the recurring exercise of police
power bears the hallmarks of a failed industrial relations system .
In this story, the goal o f equalization of bargaining power seems to fit neatly with
the goal of industrial peace. Workers needed the protection of a collective bargaining
apparatus that could resolve labor disputes peacefully. With this interpretat ion of the
equalization of bargaining power, the two goals are complementary and both are needed
for either to be realized.
The second story reaches a very different conclusion. at least in a competitive
economy. First, by the lights of neoclassical economic theory, the procedural and sub
stantive aspects of the goal of equalizing bargaining power are inconsistent. The higher
the union wage, the lower is the level of employment in the union sector. The substan
tive goal of a high wage t hu s pulls in one direction. while the procedural goal of more
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worker covered by collective bargaining pulls in the other direction. Second, there is a
potential inconsistency between the substantive goal of higher union wages and the goal
of industrial peace. The higher the union wage level rises above the non-union wage, the
greater will be the opposition of management to paying union demands (and indeed to
union organizing efforts generally), thus resulting in a greater likelihood of strikes.
The inconsistency in the goals, however. depends very much on the political economy:
the more competitive the economy, the greater the inconsistency. In a competitive
economy there would be a strong tradeoff between higher union wages and high rates of
unionization, because both cannot be maintained. 16 If the political economy is less com
petitive, the tradeoff is Jess dramatic: the greater the degree of cartelization of markets,
the greater the ability to achieve both goals at the same time. And that indeed was the
nature of the political economy envisioned by President Roosevelt's first New Deal
legislative agenda. But the U . S . economy has become increasingly competitive since the
New DeaL with the shift away from a coordinated economy and toward a commitment
to antitrust principles and with the rise of deregulation and liberal t rade policies. I n this
new environment, the tradeoff between higher union wage rates and union density has
become sharper. The substantive and procedural dimensions of the goal of increasing
workers· bargaining power have become irreconcilable.
The complexities and potential inconsistencies inherent in this second goal of the
NLRA is one reason for emphasizing the more straightforward goal of industrial peace.
But another reason lies in the dramatic statutory revisions of 1 947. When Congress
enacted the Taft-Hartley Amendments to the NLRA, there was little question that it
was see king to promote industrial peace, and to confine the scope and conduct of labor
disputes. even at the obvious cost of curbing unions' bargaining power. So it is fair to say
that industrial peace was the one goal shared by the congressional majorities that pa sed
the Wagner Act and the Taft-Hartley Amendments.

II.

INDUSTRIAL STRIFE

This section focuses on the meaning of industrial peace and its opposite. industrial strife.
The section develops the meaning of industrial peace through a brief historical narrative.
Unlike the decades that are chronicleu in thi section. the U nited States today has little o r
no industrial strife. Consequently, it may be difficult for us to picture the state o f indus
trial relations in the decades beginning with the railroad strikes of 1 8 7 7 running through
the passage of the Taft-Hartley Amendments of 1947 .
The genius of the labor law reforms of the 1 930s and 1 940s lay in the fact that
through trial and error they replaced a system marked by violent confrontational labor
management strife with a system where d isagreements were channeled into a peaceful
mechanism that avoided major disruptions to interstate commerce. Although a ful l
survey of U .S. labor history i s beyond the scope o f this chapter, well-recognized and
readily available scholarly references develop a good picture of the state of industrial and
labor relations during this period. However, in order t o assess the labor laws' objective
..
of industrial peace. it is helpful to review what industrial conflict" actually meant in the
decades leading up to the period of major national labor legislation.
The violent strikes of the late 1 9th and early 20th centuries had a choreography of their
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own. Companies frequently employed their own security forces to defeat strikes, whether
the strikes were legal or not. I n that setting. the strikes often led t o violence and confronta
tions with local police. If the local police were unable to contain the violence and the riot
conditions that sometimes developed, the governors of the affected states or the president
would call out the National Guard or federal troops. The result would be a violent one,
often with some deaths, before the military was able to restore order. To the authors of the
Wagner Act. industrial strife did not mean orderly strikes. Instead i t meant violence and.
in the extreme, riots that had the potential to paralyze an entire city or region.
The meaning of industrial strife in the 1930s was informed by a 70-year period of dis
ruptive labor-management strife. The Great Railroad Strike began in 1 877 in the midst
of a severe national depression that led to deflation in prices and wages (Dubofsky.
1 994). After the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad cu t wages and intensified workloads.
workers went on strike in West Virginia and disrupted the movement of train traffic.
Fighting began in West Virginia where state officers determined that they Jacked suf
ficient police power to resume train traffic; they asked for the aid of the federal militia to
end the strike ( Dubofsky, 1994). Although federal troops successfully restored order i n
West Virginia. vio lence inten sified as the railroad strike spread to three other states. The
arrival of state militia initiated street battles between the troops and strikers. On several
of these occasions. employers called in the Pinkerton Detective Agency. which supplied
spies, agents, and private armed forces ready and willing to combat unruly workers.
Many blame their aggressive tactics for intensifying the fighting.
The conflict soon spread beyond West Virginia. For nearly two days Pittsburgh was
known as the "'smoky city'' as nearly 80 buildings were burned, over 2,000 railroad cars
were destroyed, and 24 people were left dead ( Brecher, 1 997) . Before the strike ended, it
had spread to other cities, including Baltimore, Cincinnati. Chicago and St. Louis. The
state militia failed in its efforts to retain order in almost every instance, leading state
off i cials to request federal military intervent ion. President Hayes granted all of these
requests and dispatched federal troops to six states.
Labor unrest was hardly limited to the railroads. As organized labor quickly grew i n
size, reaching nearly 3 million members shortly after the turn of the century, the inci
dence of strikes and violence also increased. A few other examples of the strike scene in
the United States prior to the New Deal illustrate this point. From 1 903-05 the Colorado
mining industry was immersed in a war between management and workers over wages.
Unable to control the strike, the governor declared martial law and federal troops were
used to break the st rike at the request of management. The period between 1 9 1 0 and
1 91 5 was commonly referred t o as an ··age of industrial violence" as u nions struck back
at anti-union employers, culminating in the 1 9 1 0 bombing of the Los Angeles Times
building. After America declared war in 1 9 1 7, more than 4,000 strikes broke out involv
ing over 1 million workers. Citywide strikes broke out in cities such as Springfield.
Illinois; Kansas City, Missouri; Waco, Texas; and Billings, Montana ( Brecher. 1 997).
The primary legal tactic adopted by employers prior to the New Deal was the labor
injunction. It was a highly effective tool to cripple or end strikes.17 If an employer whose
facilities were affected by a strike could allege a danger of irreparable i njury that was too
imminent to risk delay. a judge cou ld issue a temporary restraining order pending a pre
liminary hearing. The preliminary hearings often resu lted i n the issuance of a temporary
injunction on the basis of employers' allegations alone (Summers, Wellington and Hyde,
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1982). Judges had wide discretion in granting injunc t ions and employers often succeeded
in their attempt to choose a pro-business judge. Once an inj unction was issued, workers
who continued to pursue the strike might find themselves in contempt of court. and
thrown in jail without a jury trial; or they might respond with violence when the authori
tie ought to enforce the judicial action. But i f the workers abided by the preliminary
injunction and suspended their strike, the cause was often lost before the case could be
heard on the merits.
Industrial strife worsened during and in the aftermath of World War I . First, t he
shortage of workers during World War I helped galvanize unions to push for higher
wages, and, in addition, the n umber of workers who belonged to uni ons increased
sharply. I n this regard, the year 1 9 1 9 was pivotal. There were 3,000 strikes involving 4
million workers , many involving mas s riots and bombings. Even the police walked out
in the dramatic Boston police s trike. A major strike involving steel workers was broken
up by federal troops and U . S . marshals. Widespread strike activity broke out again
during the summer of 1 922 among the coal miners and the railroad shop craft workers
( Dubofsky, 1 994). More specifically, the coal miners· strike of 1922 was considered one
of the largest strikes in American history, comprising workers in both bituminous and
anthracite mines. The early 1 920s also saw the first national railroad strike since 1 894,
comprising 400,000 railroad shopmen and non-operating railroad workers.
Adding to the tension and the political stakes, two American communist parties
appeared, both with some presence in the growing labor movement. Many business and
political leaders feared that labor demands might become more broadly political and less
narrowly tied to improving wages and working conditions ( D ubofsky. 1 994). Violent
s t rikes where federal t roops or ational Guard units were deployed might enflame the
more radical elements in the labor movement that aimed to change the political regime.
To the political es tablishment, the need for a peaceful resolution of labor strife became
more vital than ever.
The transformational decade for organized labor came with the Great Depress ion.
As the Depress ion set in. public demands for federal intervention and reform brought
Franklin Roosevelt to the pres idency. The new Democratic administration sought
subs tantive labor law reform that might avoid the strife that would likely accompany
the severe downturn in business. The res ult was the National Industrial Recovery Act
(N tRA) of 1933. The Act guaranteed workers minimum wages, maximum hours. and the
right to form unions ( O u bofs ky, 1994).
Rather than bringing industrial peace. the legislative gains for unions resulted i n
more organizing activity. which itself became a major sourl:e o f industrial strife. Worker
militancy increa ed as unions demanded the right to bargain collectively and employers
remained equally adamant in resisting labor's efforts (Oubofsky. 1994). Labor historian
Irving Bernstein ( 1 970 ) describes the industrial struggle during this period as includ
ing ·•strikes and social upheavals of extraordinary importance. drama, and violence
which ripped the cloak of civilized decorum from society, leaving exposed naked class
confl ict . '.
Roosevelt attempted to calm the industrial strife with the creation of t he National
Labor Board (NLB). Although the N L B did have some success, it ultimately lacked the
power needed to successfully resolve disputes (Dubofsky, 1994). Hopes for industrial
peace ended when mass violence broke out in Toledo during the auto-parts worker strike
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of 1 934 ( Bernstein, 1 970 ). Demanding a wage increase and union recognition. workers
took to the streets to picket in mass numbers and to block the plant. Facing a crowd
of 1 0.000, police attempted to enforce an injunction that limited the number of picket
ers. Fighting erupted when police attempted to arrest five picketers ( Bernstein, 1 970 ) .
The struggle continued over the next few days as tear gas, gu nfire. and flying bricks left
numerous people seriously injured. The arrival of the National Guard initially intensi
fied the fighting. wou nding I 5 and killing two, but their presence eventually calmed the
situation ( Bernstein. I 970).
Sim ilar struggles broke out across the country the following year. Coal m iners and
truckers in Minneapolis and longshoremen in San Francisco waged bloody battles for
recognition. while a cotton and textile strike spread from Maine to Alabama. With over
400.000 strikers. and crowds nearly impossible to control. battles commenced on the
streets of many or the nation's cities. St rikers struggled \-Vith police. using clu bs. base
ball bats and pipes. while newspapers denounced strikers. running publications with
the headline "Commu nists captu ring ou r st reets." As casualt y numbers mounted. the
National Guard was summ oned t o restore order on all three occasions ( Bernstein, 1 970 ) .
On May 2 7 . 1935. the Supreme Court fou nd the N IRA unconstitutional in Schechter.
The passage of the National Labor Relations Act ( NLRA) in 1 935 was thus President
Roosevelt's second attempt. Conditions did improve in some ways - in terms or enabling
employees to fom1 unions and seek bargaining. But industrial strife continued. Unions
were emboldened by the new legislative endorsement of collective bargaining, while
hostile employers refused to abide by the new legislative restrictions, assuming that the
N LRA, like the N IRA. wou ld also be declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court
(Gross, 1 974). Finally, in 1 937, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the N LRA,
based on a massive factu a l record detailing past industrial strife and its disastrous effect
on interstate commerce ( Gross, 1 974).
The Supreme Court's ruling in favor of the N LRA curbed the concerted employer
defiance of the Act, but it did not succeed in achieving industrial peace. I n late 1 937,
steelworkers waged battle against the steel companies across four states. Violence broke
ou t as police attempted t o disperse a massive crowd of strikers. I n Chicago, fighting
turned deadly. On a day known in labor history as the ''Memorial Day M assacre," police
killed ten strikers and wounded dozens (Dubofsky, 1 994). Also in 1 937, a wave of sit
down strikes involved close to 400,000 workers (Brecher, 1 99 7). The union victory i n the
General Motors sit-down of 1 937 turned the sit-down into a popu lar strike device. The
Ford Motor Company experienced mass picketing at its River Rouge plant in the spring
of I 94 1 a fter it failed to enter into negotiations with the U nited Auto Workers ( UAW)
( Bernstein, 1970). As workers attempted to organize. management did everything in
its power to prevent unionization. Armed with baseball bats and clubs. union picket
ers took on Ford's special police, who attacked their picket lines with bars and knives
( Bernstein. 1 970).
While workers were fighting for recognition, newly form ing industrial unions were
battling the traditional craft u nions for members at both the workplace and federation
levels. Although the leaders of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) once
proclaimed themselves allies to the American Federation of Labor ( A F L ), their affilia
tion with the AFL quickly crumbled, and the AFL and the CIO began to com pete over
membership (Bernstein. 1 970: Dubofsky, I 994). The CIO supported industrial unionism
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( Bernstein, 1 970): it represented the more diverse and porous ranks o f industrial workers.
and became known for its more militant and socially conscious labor strategies. In con
trast, the AFL largely kept to its practice of craft unionism and the representation of
skilled workers ( Dubofsky, 1 994) . The internecine conflict between the A F L and the
CIO only added to the level of industrial turbulence at the time.
When the United States became involved i n World War II, President Roosevelt met
with the nation's top labor and corporate leaders to develop a wartime labor relations
system. The AFL and the CIO put their differences aside for the moment, and all parties
agreed to condemn lockouts and strikes for the duration of the war ( D ubofsky, 1 994).
Although initially a success, the wartime system quickly crumbled. By 1 943 workers
were engaged in a wave of unauthorized wildcat strikes that threatened production
( Dubofsky, 1994). The strikes were unauthorized, but the unions o ften used the resulting
instability to increase their contract demands ( Dubofsky, 1 994 ). After several wartime
strikes that outlasted his mediation efforts, an angry Roosevelt condemned the · 'selfish
preoccupations of civilians" and in 1 944 supported a National Service Act that would
require Americans to either work or fight ( Blum, 1 976).
The War Labor Board attempted to resolve industrial disputes without strikes or
lockouts. But when dispute resolution failed, the government had a new policy option to
help the parties resolve their disputes: executive orders allowing the government to seize
companies.18 During the war, there were no fewer than 1 8 executive orders centering on
labor regulation (Sparrow, 1 996). President Roosevelt and President Truman conducted
7 1 industrial seizures ( Sparrow, 1 996). In fact, the number of seizures increased during
each year of the war. and peaked in fiscal year 1 944 and fiscal year 1 945 ( Sparrow,
1 996).19 Of the top 1 00 American corporations, more than one-third were seized either
in whole or in part (Sparrow, 1 996). Among those seized were railroads, coalmines, and
even the Montgomery Ward department store (Perrett, 1 973).
Roosevelt was not the only one frustrated by union demands. By the end o f the war
many members of Congress and voters no longer viewed organized labor as the under
dog it had once been in the 1 930s. Rather. it was seen by many. including some of its
erstwhile allies. as abusing its new powers (Dubofsky. 1 994). Political and public frustra
tion with labor·s tactics arter World War I I , along with Republicans' sweep of Congress
in 1 946. Jed to the passage of the Taft-Hartley Amendments in 1 947. which had the votes
to overcome President Truman ·s veto of the legislation.
The passage of the TaCt- Hartley Amendments marked a major change in the legal
regime and political economy established by the Wagner Act. The Tal"t- Hartley Act
reframed the basic policy of the N L RA from one of encouraging unionization and col
lective bargaining to one of neutrality, and of protecting employees' choice to unionize
or not. It also matched the original set of employer unfair labor pract ices with a set o f
union u n fair labor practices that arguably targeted labor's most effective and disruptive
economic tactics - the very tactics that had proven most effective in enhancing unions'
bargaining power.
Industrial peace would continue to be elusive for several years . but the passage of
Taft-Hartley was the historical marker that represented the peak in industrial strife.
Strikes thereafter were largely peaceful and more narrowly confined to t he immediate
parties involved in the labor disputes. Moreover, in the emerging postwar prosperity, the
public attitude toward unions and the ongoing frequent strike activity t u rned from being
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supportive to being opposed. Overall there was a political shift tO\\·ard conservatism that
undercut public support for unions.
Although the decline in strike activity was to take place gradually over several
decades. one critical and immediate result of the Taft-Hartley Amendments \vas the
disappearance of violent strikes. The near century of serious industrial strife ended with
Taft-Hartley. The National Guard and federal troops were no l o nger called upon to
restore order and encourage peaceful negotiations.20 the employers' private police were
less frequently deployed, a n d the president did not see the need to seize companies in
order to protect the public interest. A nev.: sy tem of industrial relations began l O take
shape as employers and union leaders learned to successfully negotiate either an initial
collective bargaining contract or a follow-up contract in a relationship that both sides
assumed to be ongoing ( Dubofsky, 1 994).
In the new relationship. most disputes either centered on contract interpretation.
which was often resolved in arbitration by a new cadre of labor relations arbitrators. or
the development of a new contract. which was worked on by pecialized labor lawyers.
The result was that the parties developed a kind of day-to-day cooperation, which
enabled them to resolve disputes in a more peaceful manner off the streets and usually
outside of the public courts ( Dubofsky. 1 994) .
Although the level of strikes was lower in the 1 950s than before the passage o f Taft
Hartley, it remained high by current standards. By the 1 960s. most strikes and confron
tations between employers and employees took on a ritualistic character in which neither
the future of the union n o r the achievement of a collective agreement was in doubt.
Industrial conflict lost its association with political milita ncy, unruliness and violence.
Yes, strikes were often still part of the ritual, but a new and more peaceful choreography
had taken hold (Dubofsky, 1 994).
The outright collapse in strike activity occurred in the 1 980s with the election of
President Reagan. The election of President Reagan and the repudiation of President
Carter's attempt for a second term speak to the underlying change in the electorate. The
single dramatic seismic event in the labor landscape was President Reagan's decision
to replace the striking air traffic controllers in 1 98 1 . That critical decision emboldened
employers to use economic weapons available to them under the N L RA, such as the
replacement of striking workers when impasse was reached.
For the last 20 years, strike activity has been a fraction - and a declining fraction - of
its former self. What I describe as a maturation of an employment relationship into a
peaceful mode was to union activists the beginning of the end for their particular vision
of labor unionism. The idea that unionization would become the spearhead of a more
radical reform of the workplace or of society dropped off the mainstream political
agenda. In the widespread political consensus that emerged after World War I I , indus
trial peace and continued economic prosperity were favored over radical labor law
reform or radical social change of any kind.21

III.

THE FOUR LEGAL REGI M E S

I n thi s section. I discuss t h e capacity of each of the four legal regimes to achieve the goals
of industrial peace and equality of bargaining power. 1 focus on only a few of the most
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salient features of each legal regime as they affect the achievement of the statutory goals.
since a comprehensive treatment of even one of the four is beyond the scope and page
limit of this chapter. I also match the legal regime with the economic model that best
captures the rules of the regime.
A.

The National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA): Taking Wages out of Competition

The N IRA was the centerpiece of President Roosevelt's first New Deal. Of the alterna
tive legal regimes it had a critical feature that might have supported wide-scale unioniza
tion in the United States: a coordinated policy of reform that would a ffect not only labor
law, but also antitrust and corporate law. The theme was to replace "free competition"
with managed '·fair competition . ''21
The legal structure of the N I R A is known as corporatism. Corporatism emphasizes
cooperation among interest groups or constituencies - especially labor and capital and between those constituencies and the government. The role of the government is
to define an objectively cognizable "public interest" that is developed through active
collaboration with the relevant constituent groups. Once the public interest is expressed,
firms and other associations are challenged to adapt their policies so as to support the
public interest.
Within the consultative process. individual companies would be represented at the
policy table by a trade association. Labor unions would also have a seat at the policy
table representing employees' interests. At the national level, these constituencies are
assembled hierarchically, with "peak associations" at the top holding the most influ
ence with government policymakers. These peak associations are groups like organized
industry-wide business associations or national labor federations. the broad membership
of which is thought to discourage narrow conceptions of political interest. These peak
groups are also expected to exert discipline among their constituent local groups so as t o
maintain cohesive support for national policies.
In the incipient corporatism of the early New Deal, the constit uency groups had to
come together at the policy table to develop industry codes of practice. To bring this
about. the administration sought to convene corporate leaders and union leaders from
most of the major industries to deal \vith economic problems. One problem with this
scheme was that unions represented only a small percentage of the private labor force
at that time. Without labor unions that broadly represent employees' interests. industry
codes would likely be unbalanced. rel1ecting only the interests or business.
To provide a countervailing power to corporations. the NIRA actively encouraged
unionization. The result was that union membership grew exponentially in the period
following the adoption of the N I RA. In August 1 932 there were 307 federal and local
unions affiliated with the A F L. In July and August 1 9 3 3 . immediately a l'ter the passage
of the N I RA, 340 new charters were issued to federal and local unions. In the following
year. a n addi tiona! 1 . 1 96 charters were issued.�3
Codes of practice were adopted for most industries. Businesses were not forced into
associations against their will. Instead there were enormous incentives to join the process
since the codes enabled firms to legally fix prices. At the level of the individual firm,
participation in the process was critical since the codes were legally binding on the entire
industry. For the individual firm to protect its own interests it had to join the process.
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Similar incentives existed at the industry leveL If the trade association in a particular
industry was a reluctant player, that reluctance usually gave way because the NIRA
could adopt a code for an industry that failed to adopt one ( Brand, 1 988 ).�4
The economic model of the N I RA legal regime, stripped to its essentials, was to car
telize indu try in order to prevent price and wage competition from feeding dellation.
With higher prices and no price competition, companies could pay the higher wages
demanded by newly unionized workers. The term "cartel" was not used to describe the
codes' agreements, but that is what they represented; and it was this feature of the N I RA
that encouraged corporations to participate. The opportunity to cartelize the product
market to dampen price competition under state policy is a plum that should not be
underestimated.
Jn return for allowing businesses to fix prices, codes had to grant employees the right
to participate in union activities ( H osen. 1 992). At the heart of the N I R A 's labor policy
was section 7(a). which required that each code recognize the rights of employees . . to
organize and bargain collectively through representative of their own choo ing free
from employer interference:· Section 7(a) was breakthrough legislation for the union
movement. providing labor the right to organize and to d o so without interference from
employers.25 The exact scope of the right to be free from interference was never clarified,
but it did provide the basis for limiting the employer's right to hire and fire based on an
employee's interest in unionization ( Brand, 1 98 8 ) .
Most important l y, the NIRA held o u t the promise of a truly cooperative relationship
between labor and capitaL The two constituencies needed each other. The cartelization
of labor markets by unions helped employers to avoid price-cutting by competitors.
The cartelization of product markets also provided the extra revenue to fund the higher
wage. From a political perspective, management associations and labor unions worked
together to form the codes of behavior that would guide individual actors. The national
unions and even more so the federations were to be consulted on all industrial policy
issues affecting their membership.
The corporatist moment was too short-lived in the United States to provide a picture
of how the fully formed policies might have functioned. However, the N I RA was the
most radical attempt of the Roosevelt administration to reset the political economy o f
t he country. I f t h e N I RA h a d survived, t he history o f the labor unio n movement would
look very different.
With its emphasis on fair rather than free competition, the economic model of the
N I RA does not fare well under the scrutiny of neoclassical economics. From a welfare
perspective, an economy built around cartelized industries leads t o various inefficien
cies. Wages are high, but because they are high relative to equilibrium market-clearing
wages, the result is unemployment. Cartelized economies can also be inefficient because
they stifle change. The conflict between neoclassical economics and the N I RA is hardly
surprising, however, since the goal of the I RA was largely to replace the market
mechanisms that are the cornerstone of neoclassical economics.
The policies of the N I R A would have proved much more appealing if the view o f
economics held by the Roosevelt administration had been correct. I f the dynamics o f
capitalism did indeed have a tendency to regularly produce a deflationary cycle, then
unions would have played a critical function. By engaging in collective bargaining
they would prevent downward pressure on wages, thus sustaining purchasing power
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and averting the development of a deflationary cycle that was the plague of the Great
Depression.
B.

The Wagner Act: Promoting the Spread of Unionization

Congress was at work on a successor statute to the NIRA well before the latter was
struck down by the Supreme Court. The heart of the Wagner Act, Section 7, was largely
a carryover from Section 7 ( a) of the N I RA.26 Workers were given a right to join labor
organizations, to bargain collectively and to engage in concerted activity such as strikes,
without · 'i nterference, restraint or coercion'' by managementY Unlike the N I RA. which
was broad in scope but lacked detail, the N L R A provided a detailed set of rules for
both union recognition and collective bargaining. It forbade many employer tactics that
discouraged unionization, including the creation of management-dominated employee
representation plans; set up machinery for determining the union designated as their
representative by a majority of the employees; and d irected employers "to bargain col
lectively'' with the chosen representatives in good faith.
The intent of the Wagner Act was to foster collective bargaining, and its proponents
appeared to assume that the result of the Act would be that most workers, at least
in the major industries, would eventually become u n ionized. Unlike the predeces
sor N I RA , however. the Wagner Act o ffe red no tinancial benefits or inducements
for employers to join in this endeavor. M oreover. while Section 8 contained a list o f
employer practices that would constitute an unfair labor practice, there was no com
parable list for unfair union practices. This represented a remarkable empowerment of
unions to organize new sectors and win extensive contracts. While the employer faced
many constraints in resisting union gains, the unions had few constraints i n using their
econom 1 c weapons.
The Wagner Act also sought to solve an endemic problem of the N IRA, namely the
lack of effective enforcement powers. The National Labor Board under the N I R A was
created through an executive order and only had the power to mediate disputes. The
Wagner Act created a new body, the National Labor Relations Board ( N LRB). to
conduct secret-ballot representation elections and to remedy unfair labor practices. The
N L RB was established as a quasi-judicial body. with the general counsel investigating
and prosecuting unfair labor practice complaints. Cases were to be heard by an adminis
trative law judge. whose decisions could be appealed to the N LRB and then to the U . S .
Court of Appeal .
To achieve its goal of promoting industrial peace, the Wagner Act provided for a legal
strike mechanism which channeled concerted activity into a peaceful form: employees
were given the right to strike, but that right was required to be exercised in a peace
ful fashion. It was assumed that violence would render strike activity unprotected and
subject to existing state criminal and civil laws. What was not entirely clear was whether
Section 7 trumped existing state laws and protected all peaceful union activity.28
It was also hoped that. by granting employees the right to bargain collectively, the Act
would make employers understand the fundamental changes to rules of the employment
relationship. Compelled to live with unions, perhaps employers would learn to cooperate
with them. The result would be a more cooperative spirit vvhere the parties would resolve
differences through negotiations.29
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The cooperative spirit envisioned by Senator Wagner was an impossible dream from
the beginning. If unions and employers fou nd it difficu lt to cooperate u nder the I RA.
how could they be expected to cooperate under the N L RA? Under the NIRA, higher
union wages would be paid for by consumers in the form of higher profits protected by
the codes of conduct. Under the N L RA. however, higher union wages were to be paid
for out of corporate profits since the employers could be forestalled from increasing
prices by product market competition from non-union producers or those with \Neaker
Ul1l011S.

Whereas the economic model of the N I R A was to cartelize both product and labor
markets. the economic model of the N L RA was to cartelize the labor market only. The
difference is critical. In the economic model or the Wagner Act. product market competi
tion continues unabated. There is no win-win here. only win-lose. That did not provide
the fou ndation for industrial peace. Wherea the N I RA. i f successful. could take wages
out of competition, the Wagner Act could only take wages ou t of competition if the
entire industry. including all new entrant , were unionized and wages were bargained at
the industry level. Under t h e best of circumstances that wou ld take time to develop. But
from the out et, staying non-union under the Wagner Act gave firms much lower labor
cost ·, which provided a great inducement to stay non-union.;u
Under the original Wagner Act, unions had considerable bargaining power over
employers. For example, since there were no union unfair labor practices, the strike
weapon could be used freely under the Wagner Act in support of union recognition
(subject to the uncertain force of state law) . For example, when a union met resistance
from an employer it hoped to u nionize. it could boycott the employer, set up a ··recog
nitional'' picket line, and then pressure that employer's business cu stomers or suppliers.
through strikes or boycotts, to refuse to deal with the target employer. Through the
secondary boycott. unionized workers in one firm cou ld pressure their employer to put
pressure in turn on a resisting company, either to recognize a union or to sacrifice its
business relationship with t he initial company.31
The Wagner Act also allowed for "closed shop" rules which provided another pow
erful source of union strength. Under this system, employers committed themselves
contractually to hire only union members; thus employees had to be members of the
union before being h i red, and had to remain members or else they would be ftred. This
was a very powerful organizing device. The closed shop concept fits the assumption
of the Wagner Act that most workers would organize. If most workplaces were closed
shops, then workers would end up being a rnem ber of a bargaining unit whose terms and
conditions of employment were set in collective bargaining.32
Importantly, the closed shop also gave the u nion the power to discipline its own
members. Members who engaged in a wildcat strike could be expelled from the union
and would thus lose their jobs. The closed shop ru le made the worker a Joyal union
member first and a loyal employee second, as the union might control employees' access
to most or all of the jobs in the trade, while the employer only controlled those jobs in
its own enterprise.
In addition, the Act favored collective bargaining as the preferred form of the employ
ment relationship and, implicitly, favored spreading collective bargaining throughout
the economy. With collective bargaining, the wage that would emerge would be higher
than the competitive wage. The Act imposed upon employers a duty to bargain in good
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faith with "respect to wages. hours. and other tenns and condition of employment.'' As
a result, the union could impose costs on the employer by using its strike weapon. The
competitive wage would be the floor, and the effectiveness of the strike weapon would
determine the pay premium that the union could achieve.
In effect, unions were given the right to exercise monopoly power in the labor market
by setting wages collectively. From an efficiency perspective, the higher union wages
and benefits would be expected to cause a lower level of employment than would occur
in a competitive market. The union's bargaining effect on economic variables is similar
to that of a monopolist in the product market where the firm garners higher profits b y
restricting supply.
C.

The N L R A after Taft-Hartley: Competition between Union and Non-Union Firms

The Taft-Hartley Amendments left the preamble statement of the Act largely intact and.
in that respect, did not explicitly alter the goals of the legislation.33 There were, however,
some highly significant modifications that implicitly changed the Act's goals. Archibald
Cox in his famous article from 1 947 argued that Taft-Hartley changed the N L RA from
actively encouraging unionization to being neutral toward it.
Nowhere is this clearer than in the revised Section 7, entitled ''the rights of employees."
In the original Wagner Act, Section 7 contained the sweeping language that employees
had the right to join a union, to bargain collectively, and to engage in concerted activity
such as strikes. The Taft-Hartley Amendments left those rights in place. but added that
workers ' ' have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities." Taft- Hartley thus
approved the legitimacy of the non-union employment relationship and removed one
of the effective tools that union organizers had used since the N I RA; namely, the claim
that, by unionizing, workers were following the policy adopted by two very popular
presidents, FDR and Harry Truman.
Taft-Hartley shared with the Wagner Act the goal o f industrial peace. I t ought to
reduce the industrial strife that continued after the passage of the Wagner Act and
accelerated during World War I I , and it did so not by strengthening unions but by
weakening them. Mo ·t of the changes brought by Taft-H artley reduced the scope
and etTectiveness of the economic weapons available to the union in organizing new
workers. The secondary boycott, a very powerful but disruptive and ot'ten violent
tool in unionizing new establishments, was outlawed. In addition, the Taft-Hartley
Amendments sharply restricted the use of strikes or picketing for recognition when
another union was certitied as the exclusive bargaining representative, or in the absence
of majority support. As noted in the section on strike history, battles between unions to
organize workplaces that were already organized were a major cause of industrial strife
after World War I I .
Critically. the Taft-Hartley Act also outlawed the closed shop. Under the "union
shop" rules that replaced the closed shop, employees did not need to be members of a
union as a condition of employment. Instead. the collective bargaining agreement could
require that an employee join the union and was given at least 30 days from the date of
hire to join. Under the so-called ''union shop,'' unions lost control of the employer's
available labor supply. The employer could hire a worker directly rather than through
the union.
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The union shop framework was a middle ground that loosened the control of the
union while still retaining a strong union identification for employees. Although the loss
of closed shop status was important to unions. i t was minor compared to the effect of the
.
·'open shop, . \.vhich severed the link between employment and union membership and
gutted labor union control of the labor supplyJ1 And that was precisely what the Taft
Hartley Act all owed the states to do, in what remains the Act's one explicit concession
to state law.
Under § 1 4( b ) states were permitted to pass ··right to work" laws mandating the "open
shop.'' In a right-to-work state. employees hired into a bargaining unit job did not have
to join the union or pay dues. The effect of the right-to-work laws, which were especially
popular in the South. was to make it much more difficult for a union to organize and
sustain a bargaining unit. The open shop creates a powerful free-rider effect so that even
workers who are in favor of a union have an incentive not to join the union because they
can enjoy the benefits without paying dues.
Taft-Hartley also added a new Section 8(c) to clarify that employers have the right to
express their views about unionization in response to a union organizing drive. Prior to
Taft- Hartley. some NLR B rulings had put in doubt whether the employer could wage its
own campaign against a union seeking to organize its labor force: Taft-Hartley made it
clear that employers could do so. The enhanced ability and willingness of employers t o
fight unionization o f their companies was a n important factor i n stopping the spread of
unionization.
The main effect of Taft-Hartley was to limit the spread of unionization throughout
the economy. Consequently, the economic model of the Taft-Hartley legal regime is one
with both a union sector and a non-union sector. The relative difficulty of organizing, as
well as the ban on the "closed shop," guarantees that there will be a vibrant non-union
sector, especially in the "right-to-work" states that require an ''open shop . " In the right
to-work states� a non-union sector would likely develop even in industries that were
heavily unionized in other states.
The economic model of the Taft-Hartley Act has a non-union sector competing
actively with a union sector. The automotive industry presents an important example
of the competition between union and non-union firms in the same industry. The tra
ditional unionized automobile assembly manufacturers and parts suppliers are located
in the industrial belt around Detroit and Ohio, while non-union (and foreign-owned)
assembly plants and domestic automotive parts suppliers set up shop mostly in the right
to-work states. As a consequence of the lower labor costs. the non-union manufacturers
can deliver a less expensive product. The result is steady erosion in the profits of the
unionized plants and a concomitant reduction in union employment. The key point is
that, for both parts and final products, prices are being determined at the margin, and
the non-union companies are the ones at the margin and thus determining price. Union
companies have little to no ability to pass through cost differences to buyers (Hi rsch.
200 8 ) .35
Commentators stress the importance of international trade, and competition from
domestic or foreign companies' plants overseas. i n promoting a non-union sector that
can undercut union businesses in the United States. G lobalization of markets makes the
story easier to tell, and is important, but the same outcomes are likely without that story
because of the persistence and cost advantages of the non-union sector in the U . S .'6
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The Non-Union Sector: The Norm-Based Employment Relationship (and its
CompetitiYe Advantage)

The non-union sector has its own legal regime, one that has come to dominate the U .S .
labor market in a ll b u t a few industries and regions. Obviously, the employees in this
sector have not exercised their right to union representation (or have not managed to
garner majority support in the face of strong management opposition) and hence are
not regulated by most of the provisions of the N L R A . The employees have little to no
bargaining power and must act individually. Very few of them enjoy the protections of
an enforceable contract, or of "just cause''-type job security, and they do not have a bar
gaining agent to represent their interests before the employer. In a sense, the legal regime
is marked more by the absence of rights than by the presence of rights.
This legal regime has two components. The first is the employment-at-will doctrine,
which governs the norms of the workplace. The second is a set of government mandates
such as the FLSA, OSHA and ERISA, as well as Title V I I and other antidiscrimination
laws.
The employment-at-will doctrine is often stated in the following stark form: that
an employer can fire an employee for good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all
( Ehrenberg, 1 989). As I have argued elsewhere, the doctrine of employment-at-will is
more of a jurisdictional boundary than a legal rule that is applied in its literal meaning
(Rock and Wachter, 1 996). By stating the employer's prerogatives as broadly as possible,
the employee who believes that she was wrongfully discharged simply cannot sustain a
claim. (There are exceptions, such as race or gender discrimination or whistleblowing,
that complicate the picture; but let us ignore them for now . )
Take the case of a non-union employee who works i n a production o r non-s upervisory
position and is discharged for what she believes to be false or frivolous reasonsY She
may be able to bolster her complaint with evidence showing that she was never told of
poor performance. that her regular job reviews were good. or even that the supervisor
was lying about her performance. If the employee were to sue. under the strict employ
ment-at-will doctrine. the case would be dismissed for failure to state a claim . The reason
for discharge, or the quality of the employer's evidence, would be simply irrelevant. The
purpose of stating employment-at-will so broadly is thus to cut off judicial scrutiny of
such claims. and to avoid enforcement through the legal system. The courts accept this
jurisdictional boundary by dismissing the suit. leaving the dispute to be settled without
judicial i nterference. The employer thus retains almost complete discretion as to when
it can discharge a worker. Moreover. under employment-at-will, employers can change
terms and conditions of employment at will , too.
If taken literally, this rule seems to promote rampant opportunism and unfairness.
Some particular kinds of unfairness have been addressed, to be sure, by legislation and
a variety of tort doctrines arising under the aegis of "public policy." Yet employment
at-will survives insofar as employers have no general duty to justify discharge decisions;
they may terminate employment for any reason or for no reason at all (as long as they do
not do so for a reason that violates some statute or public policy ) .
What then explains the almost universal fact t h a t the non-union employment rela
tionship works without use of an enforceable contract for most of its terms? One pos
sible answer is that employers are able to exploit their superior bargaining power over
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employees and impose this u n fair arrangement. But that begs the question of why some
employers have not found it worthwhile to offer job security. perhaps in exchange for
lower wage , to attract employees who value job security. A more complete answer to
this question takes us to the economic model o f the non-union sector. Having discussed
above the workings of the non-union E L M , the focus here turns to the workings of the
labor market inside the firm; that is, the I L M . As a consequence. the appropriate model
is the neoclassical theory of the non-union I L M , which is a component of the neoclassi
cal theory or the firm.
We first need to consider why a firm decides to bring an activity inside the firm ( the
··make" decision) versus leaving the activity outside the firm and buying the services
from another firm or entity (the "buy'' decision ) . When the decision is made to bring
the activity inside the firm, decision making \vith respect to the activity is done through
the firm ·s own hierarchy. The individuals involved in the activity do not contract with
the employer regarding most terms and condition : rather most decisions are made uni
laterally by the employer. The theory of the firm reaches a stark conclusion on this issue:
when contracting is inexpensive and the firm has no core competency in the area. the firm
will "buy:'' it will contract for the service or good to be provided by an outside entity.
However, when contracting is expensive or when the firm has a core competency in the
area, the fmn will "make.·· or bring the activity inside the firm.
At the heart of the contracting decision is the level of transaction costs associated with
the activity. High transaction costs make contracting costly and thus favor bringing the
activity inside the firm. Low transaction costs make contracting straightforward and less
costly, and favor leaving the activity to the market. Transaction costs are the costs asso
ciated with negotiating, writing and enforcing contracts . High transaction costs occur
when the parties interact frequently, when the interactions are connected rather than
independent events, and when the environment in which the parties interact evolves over
time. These conditions are a ll present in an ongoing relationship such as the employment
relationship inside the firm. The greater the number of contingencies that affect the rela
tionship over time. the greater is the cost of contracting. Finally. the contracting costs
are higher relative to the gains when the value at stake in each individual contingency is
low. When the transaction is a low-value event. the benefit of contracting to protect the
transaction is low, and hence even moderate contracting costs may cut deeply into the
profits generated by the transaction.
Transaction costs are typically high in the employment relationship due to a full range
of factors such as whether the employee's training is firm-specific and has little use at
other firms, and if the employer has access t o information, such as job risks, not available
to the employee (Williamson, Wachter and Harris. 1 975). When transaction costs are
high and contract governance is too expensive. the relationships are brought inside the
firm, where they are governed by the intra -firm hierarchical governance structure. From
the perspective of transaction cost theories, the decision to bring relationships within
the firm is the decision to opt for the intra-firm governance structure over contractual
governance within markets.
With one important exception, the decision to bring the activity inside the firm means
that the activity will not be governed in most of its particulars by contract terms: there
is a contract. but it is radically incomplete, in that its terms are largely open and subject
to employer discretion. The one exception is. of course. the unionized firm in which the
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employees' rights and obligations are delineated in an enforceable collective contract.
In the union sector, a n employer's violation of the contract is prohibited by contract
law - albeit a distinctive federal common law of the collective bargaining contract that
is invariably enforceable through an internal grievance and arbitration system and only
in rare cases through litigation in court. Moreover, the union's bargaining rights are
protected by the N L R B against employer interference.
This account of the non-union employment relationship, however, raises a serious
legitimacy question: is this discretion used wisely and fairly enough so as to protect
the reasonable expectations of the employees? Employment-at-will seems facially to
encourage opportunism by employers. At least in past decades many employers may
indeed have acted in this manner: hence the outbreak of strikes and violence. Today,
employment-at-will is an accepted part of the non-union employment relationship, at
least to the extent that it is not a serious topic of labor law reform at either the national
or state level. In addition, although many labor and employment law scholars are ada
mantly opposed to employment-at-will, I know of no empirical studies that claim that it
facilitates employer opportunism.
What explains the relative lack of employer opportunism in today's non-union sector?
The answer is to be found i n the unique nature of the employment relationship. The
employment relationship is distinctive because it is an intensively repeat-play game.
The employer and the employees are in frequent interactions with each other over an
extended period. The tasks evolve over time to meet new contingencies. Monitoring is
costly and thus incomplete. I t is now well known that informal norm governance works
best in such situations because self-help methods are much more effective. In this situ
ation, an employer that engages in bad play by not following prevailing norms can be
sanctioned by the employees through techniques running from work slowdowns to
outright sabotage at the individual or collective level. In this situation i t is the firm that
arguably lacks bargaining power, since the remedy - increased monitoring - can be pro
hibitively expensive for the same reasons that contract writing is prohibitively expensive
( Rock and Wachter, 1 996).
This is not the place to recount the various self-enforcing norms that operate within
the workplace. although one example will be helpful. The employment relationship is
typically marked by the parties investing in their match . Starting a new job typically
requires the employee to acquire firm-specific skills that are useful in the current job. but
not with a ditTerent employer (Wachter and Wright, 1 990). Firm-specific investments
create a wedge between the employee's value to her current employer versus her value
to a new employer. If the employer pays all the costs associated with the firm-specific
investments, then the employee's problem is obviated, but now the firm is vulnerable i f
the employee holds u p the firm b y threatening to q ui t. If the employee has paid al l the
costs. then the employee can be held up by the firm through a threat of discharge. The
solution to the problem is for the costs to be split. The employee is paid a lower wage
during the training period. but not a wage that reflects all of the training costs. After the
training is completed and the employee now has valuable firm-specific skills, the surplus
from those skills should be divided between the parties in the form of a higher wage
for the employee and a more productive worker for the employer. The contract is self
enforcing because both sides then lose their investment if the relationship is terminated
early.
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I n addition to the self-enforcing structure or norms. other factors are also at work.
Reputational effects can be a strong deterrent to employer opportunism. Historically
industrial strife often followed as a consequence of employers cutting pay during severe
downturns in the economy. These downturns, and the resulting pay cuts, occurred at a
time when the industrial economy was a fairly new development and employers were still
learning how it worked. Nowadays, employers understand that opportunistic treatment
of employees during the downturn will make it difficult for employers to hire during
the inevitable upturn in the economy. Even during normal conditions, quit rates. or the
percentage of workers who voluntarily quit a job each year. are remarkably high. with
most of the turnover occurring in the early years of employment. As a consequence. the
employer is constantly forced to hire in tl1e competitive job market even to retain a given
SiZe.
The ultimate deterrent to employer opport unism is the threat effect of unionization. A
non-union firm will become much less profitable if unionized ( Williamson, Wachter and
Harris. 1 97 5 ) . Wage and benefits will likely be raised above competitive levels and the
firm will have the transaction costs of negotiating a collective bargaining agreement that
will also impose restrictions on its ability to unilaterally manage its workforce.
The second component or the non-union legal regime is the extensive set of govern
ment mandates such as the FLSA, OSHA. and ERISA, as well as Title V I I and other
antidiscrimination laws. Describing these manda tes is beyond the scope of this chapter.
They do however serve an important function in the workings or the non-union employ
ment relationship. particularly regulating areas of the relationship that are prone to
employer opportunism. Mandates such as ERISA and OSHA serve to remedy potential
problems of information asymmetries. In the context of both employee benefit programs
and workplace safety, the complexity of the issues and the employer's superior knowl
edge of them create a potential market failure. The employer could tell its employees
that the jobs are safe and that the pension plan i s well invested when, in fact, the jobs are
very risky and the pension plan is entirely invested in the company's own common stock.
The problem is resolved by forcing the employer to disclose relevant information and
imposing standards on pension plans and workplace safety.
The solution in this case is government regulations that require the companies to meet
certain safety standards for both the jobs and the pensions. I n addition, the regulations
force the employer to disclose relevant facts to its employees. Violations of the law
leave the company facing civil or criminal sanctions imposed by the relevant agency or
class-action suits brought by aggrieved employees.
Mandates such as minimum wages, child labor prohibitions and discrimination-free
employment serve a different function. Rather than correcting a market imperfection,
these impose a public moral standard. Such regulations impose minimum standards on
the theory that market-determined outcomes are unacceptable as a matter of national
policy (Bennett and Taylor, 2002). In such cases, the outcomes o f a $ 1 wage or the
employment of a child under 1 0 may be efficient in that they do not hamper the opera
tion of the price mechanism. But maximizing social welfare is not coincidental with
economic efficiency. Society can declare as a national policy that certain outcomes.
whether economically efficient or not. are simply unacceptable outcomes. Such policies,
by reOecting the social welfare function. increase overall welfare and are thus the correct
actions to take.
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If government regulation proves to be an acceptable policy respon e to major norm
failures when they emerge. the non-union sector can benefit from a bifurcated enforce
ment mechanism. In cases where norm governance rules, such as employment-at-will,
the enforcement mechanism is left to the private ordering of the parties. Where the
employment relationship works poorly and employer opportunism is most likely to
occur, as was the case with occupational health and safety and job discrimination, gov
ernment i ntervention is used to resolve those specific problems with targeted regulatory
solutions. This allows employers to use very inexpensive, informal contracting mecha
nisms in all but those identifiable areas where management opportunism is most likely
to occur.

IV.

W H ICH LEGAL R EGIME CAN BEST ACCO M P LISH THE
GOALS OF THE WAGNER ACT?

In this section I will evaluate which of the four legal regimes is or was most successful in
accomplishing the goals of the Wagner Act: industrial peace and equalization of bargain
mg power.
A.

The N IRA

Analyzing the N IR A in terms of its ability to achieve the goals of the Wagner Act is argu
ably unfair to the N I RA because the Act's reform - the implementation of a corporatist
political economy - was abandoned when the N I RA was declared unconstitutional. The
time period for evaluating the success of the policy is t herefore too short to get a reliable
reading. In addition, the N I RA, as workable legislation, was only a start .
Even with these caveats. the N I RA receives some credit for being the first federal labor
law legislation to provide for the right to engage in lawful concerted activity: both to
unionize and to strike without interference from employers. The Norris-LaGuardia Act.
passed in the final year of the Hoover Administration and only a year before the N I RA.
had already provided for the right to concerted activity against federal court injunctions
prohibiting such activities; but the N IRA recognized that employer interference was also
a serious impediment to workers' right to unionize.
The NIRA was an improvement over Norris-LaGuardia frorn labor · perspective.
but it was very much a work in progress. Its language was aspira tional and hortatory,
and badly lacking in specific guidance. In contract law, mandatory rules that cannot be
varied by contract are rare because the relationship is entirely voluntary. But the union
employer relationship is not the product of mutual voluntary choice. To ensure the
viability of the union sector, core mandatory terms such as the requirement to bargain in
good faith are necessary. In addition. mounting an organizing drive and bargaining col
lectively are not simple matters in an adversarial relationship, especially one that i new.
Consequently a more detailed legislative mandate was needed.
The goal of the IRA was to change the political economy of the U nited State in
a fundamental manner: free competition was to be replaced by fair competition. The
new political economy would achieve industrial peace by creating a system of recipro
cal benefits in the form of higher prices for employers and higher wages for employees.
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The benefits would not only lead to industrial peace, but vvould also reduce the tendency
toward def1ationary cycles in wages and profits. In this system. employers might plau si
bly accept unionization. Although the employer might lose discretion in having to deal
with the union, the cartelization of the product market would generate the higher prices
necessary to pay for the higher costs of being unionized.
As a practical matter, the N I RA failed on the ground, and the problems showed up
almost immediately. Price-fixing proved difficult to accomplish. No sooner had the fair
price been set than cartel members started cheating on the price to gain market share
( Brand. 1 988). 38 Non-compliance begot further non-compliance. as code-abiding bu si
ness executives began to feel the pinch of competition from cheating firms. The hoped
for stable higher prices were not achieved.
The N IRA was no more successfu l in labor relations than it was at fixing prices. I n
the N IRA framework. u nions and business were expected t o exercise self-restraint in
their bargaining demands in order to su pport national priorities. Self-interest was to
give way to the national interest. That did not happen (Brand, 1 988; Wachter. 2007). 39
Organizational strikes became more frequent and bargaining demands grew in response
to labor's perception that they had the Roosevelt administration and the law on their
side, that disruptive disputes wou ld lead to mediation, and that mediators wou l d back up
their demands (Du lles, 1 960) . 40 President Roosevelt's call for moderation i n bargaining
was ignored. Instead strikes continued to be frequent and violent, requiring the National
Guard to be called out regularly to enforce the peace.
The historical record of strike activity. as brief as it is for the N IRA, illustrates the
failure of the NIRA to reduce industrial strife. Instead of providing for greater labor
stability, the number of workdays lost to strikes tripled over the first three years of the
N I RA (Brand, 1 988). Also, as shown in Table 1 5 . 1 , the average annual number of strikes
increased dramatically from 766 in 1 930-32 to 1 ,8 3 1 in 1 933-3 5 .
The N I RA does much better with t h e goal o f equalization o f bargaining power. First,
on the procedural element, the NIRA scores high since the percentage of workers from
the private sector belonging t o unions increased from 1 5 .5 percent i n 1 933 to 1 6.3 percent
in 1 934, as shown in Table 1 5 . 2 below. More importantly, the N I R A was the catalyst
behind the surge in union membership that occurred in the 1 930s as the new unions
formed during these two years provided the impetus behind organized labor i n general.
Early organizing efforts were just beginning to show results. As discussed above, the
advocates of the Act, including Senator Wagner, viewed collective bargaining as the
antidote to unequal bargaining power. Hence, I can use u nion density as a measure of
the procedural element of the goal.
On the substantive element, the N IRA was also successful. Although i t is difficult to
find a time series of union premiums - that is, the union wage percentage differential
with respect to the non-union sector - the data su ggest a union wage premium of roughly
20 percent over the entire period covered by th is chapter. Although the exact premium
differs by industry and over time, the evidence uniformly supports the existence of a high
union wage premium over the entire period studied here.41
Overall, the N IR A scores high as the first major legislation to grapple with the prob
lems of industrial strife and unequal bargaining power. Much more statutory work
needed to be done, but the N I RA was a good first attempt. I n addition, it is worth
noting that the N I RA was the most pro-union political econom y of those studied in
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Table 15. 1

Number o.lstrikes or lockouts, average annual, over relevant periods

Relevant Period

Years Covered

Pre-

1930-32

766

1933-35

1831

Wagner Act Period

1935-48

3539

Ta ft-Hartley Period

1948-81

4398

IRA Period

IRA Period

.Vores:

Number of Strikes. Average Annual

The averages were calculated using data on work stoppages from 1 929-81 from the U.S. Bureau of

Labor Statistics (BLSJ:

Labor Swrisrics.

Handbook of Labor Srarisrics,

1 975, Bulletin number 1 865, Table 1 59;

1983, Bulletin number 2 1 75, Table 128:

Handbook of Labor S!alislics.

Handbook of

1989, Bulletin number

2340: and the BLS internet site, available at http ://hsus.cambridge.o rg/HSUSWeb/search/searchTable.

do?id=Ba4954-4964. This data set included all strikes and lockouts except those that involved fewer than six
workers. After 1 9 8 1 , the data were no longer calculated i n this manner and are unavailable.

this chapter. The success of unions depends heavily on their place within the overall
legal and economic structure of the country. The N I R A experiment provided unions
with a seat at the N IRA policy table, a high-level policy position that they would not
have thereafter. The N I R A also retlected an understanding that reforming labor law
meant reforming other laws that guided the manner in which employers dealt with labor
unions. If unions were to bargain for higher wages, the firms needed to have a way of
paying for the higher wages without facing competition from non-union firms that had
a lower cost structure.
The question is whether the NIRA was a workable policy in a large and diverse
economy such as the United States where competitive pressures are strong. The govern
ment would have to wield a big stick to keep companies from undercutting each other's
prices and to keep unions from making immoderate demands !'or better wage and
working conditions. In any event. corporatism ran up against constitutional objections.
and apparently lacked the political support it would have needed to surmount those
objections. PresidetH Roosevelt abandoned corporatism, and thus the N I RA. after it
was declared unconstitutionaL rather than attempting to revise the policy to meet the
Court's objections.
B.

The Original Wagner Act's Ability to Achjeve its Goals

One would expect that the Wagner Act would be successful in achieving its own goals.
The law of unintended consequences might get in the way, but otherwise the Act should
have gotten off to a good start . The record is more mixed.
With respect to industrial peace, the Wagner Act created a legal strike mechanism that
turned many strikes from violent ones to non-violent ones. President Roosevelt, at least
prior to World War I I , was reluctant to call in federal troops. al though governors might
still do so. The battles were still serious and disruptive, but now they were more likely
to be union picketers fighting management's private police. With President Roosevelt
favoring the unionization of the labor force. labor posed far less of a threat to the
legitimacy of the established order. This was an important change.
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Although less threatening to the established order, industrial strife, which had
already increased during the years of the N IRA. increased further under the Wagner
Act. As shown in Table 1 5. 1 , in the years prior to the adoption of the N LRA. 1 933-35.
the average number of strikes and lockouts per year was 1 .8 3 1 . In the period between
the passage of the Wagner Act and the adoption of the Taft-Hartley Amendments. the
annual number of strikes was 3,539. Rather than bringing industrial peace, the number
of strikes and lockouts nearly doubled under the Wagner Act:e
There are several explanations for the worsening in industrial strife under the N LRA.
First. particularly in the late 1 930s, many new unions were forming. undertaking their
organizing drive and bargaining for their first contract. A high level of strike activity
is not unexpected during this period. Second. the legal regime was particularly favor
able to unions. For example, as noted above. the fact that there were no unt'air labor
practice standards restricting union action meant that the strike weapon could be used
freely except as constrained by state law. Third. the aspirations of union leaders and
workers increased along with the more favorable legal regime. and rising aspirations
translated into more costly bargaining demands which were difficult to resolve without
strikes.
The jump in industrial strife went along with a sharp increase in union density. A s
shown in Table 1 5 .2, union density i n the private sector or the percentage o f workers
represented by unions was 1 4.2 percent when the Wagner Act was passed in 1 9 3 5 . By
1 939 it was 22.8 percent, and by 1 945 it was 33.9 percent . So while the Wagner Act was
unable to reduce industrial strife, it was able to increase union representation. That is.
while the first goal was proving unattainable, the second goal was being achieved. Thi s
underscores one o f the themes o f this chapter; namely that the goals o f the Wagner Act
were potentially inconsistent. While a surge of initial organizing drives may worsen
industrial strife, it does advance the second goal of equalization of bargaining power.
A potential inconsistency in the Act turns into an actual inconsistency once the sub
stantive goal of equalizing bargaining power is taken into account. Concomitant with
the increase in union density, the newly organized union members were able to achieve
higher wages and thus gained the union wage premium. Herein lies the problem. Who
would pay for the higher wages?
The N I RA had one answer: the consumers would pay. H igher prices would compen
sate the firms for the higher wages, reducing the likelihood that firms would take a strong
stance against the wage gains. The N L R A had a different answer and that was the source
of the inconsistency: firms would pay for the higher wages through reduced profits.
Although firms might be able to pass on some of the wage increases to consumers, there
is no reason to suppose that they could pass on the bulk of the increase.
The key question was whether all the firms in the product market could be unionized
or cartelized. An aspiration of the Wagner Act was for the entire labor force to be union
ized. thus eliminating competition between lower cost non-union firms and higher cost
union firms. But achieving that goal would always prove elusive. As long as non-union
firms could earn higher profits than union firms, firms would always have an incentive
to oppose unionization and, more specifically. the higher labor cost bargaining demands
of unions.
Consequently, at the heart of the inconsistency in the Wagner Act goals was the idea
that the collective wage would be higher than the market wage. I n other words, it is the
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Table

15. 2

Private sector union densit}' ( 1 929-2010)
Yea r

Year

Union Density

1929

1 2 .4

1 9 57

34.7

1 98 5

14.3

1 9 30

1 3. 3

1 9 58

33.9

1 986

1 3.8

1931

14.0

1 9 59

32.3

1 98 7

1 3 .2

1932

1 5 .2

1 9 60

3 1 .9

1 98 8

1 2. 7

1933

1 5.5

1961

3 1 .9

1 989

1 2. 3

1 934

1 6. 3

1 9 62

3 1 .6

1 990

1 1 .9

1 93 5

14.2

1963

3 1 .2

1 99 1

1 1.7

1 9 36

1 5 .0

1 9 64

3 1 .0

1 992

1 1 .4

1 93 7

19.5

1 965

30.8

1 993

1 1.1

1938

2 1 .9

1 966

30.3

1 994

10.8

1939

22.8

1 967

30.5

1 995

10.3

1 940

24.3

1 968

29.9

1 996

1 0.0

1941

25.9

1 969

29.0

1 997

9.7

1942

28 . 1

1 970

29 . 1

1 998

9.5

1 943

30.8

1971

28.2

1 999

9.4

1 944

32.4

1 972

27.3

2000

9.0

1 945

33.9

1 97 3

*24.5

2001

9.0

1 946

34. 1

1 9 74

*23.6

2002

8.6

1 947

34.9

1 97 5

* 2 1 .7

2003

8.2

Union Density

Year

Union Density

1948

34.7

1976

*21.5

2004

7.9

1 949

34.9

1977

2 1 .7

2005

7.8

1950

34.6

1 978

20.7

2006

7.4

1951

34.7

1 979

2 1 .2

2007

**7.5

1 9 52

35.2

1 980

20. 1

2008

* *7 . 6

1953

35.7

1981

1 8.7

2009

**7.2

1 954

35.6

1 982

17.6

20 1 0

**6.9

1955

35.1

1983

1 6. 5

1 9 56

34.7

1 9 84

1 5. 3

No res:

*
**

Adjusted by Hirsch (2008).

Added using data from www.unionstats.com.
The figures fo r 1 929-72 were compiled by Troy and Sheflin ( 1 98 5 ) from union financial reports. Figures from
1 9 7 3 onward are compiled from CPS household data ( Hirsch and Macpherson. 2 0 1 1 , updated at http://www.
unionstats.com). The union density figure is calculated by determining the percentage of employed workers
who are union members.

Source:

Hirsch (2008). Figure I .

substantive aspect of the second goal that would prove to be the problem. Would indus
trial strife have declined after the collective bargaining relationship matured? Again,
there is no obviou s reason to suppose that a mature relationship wou ld have become less
cantankerous.
In fact. the higher level of industrial strife continued throughout World War I I . even
in industries where u nions were well established. This helped generate pu blic support
for what became Taft-Hartley, a retreat from the expansive power granted to unions by
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the N LRA. However radical the goals of the original Wagner Act might have been. at
least in the eyes of its most progressive supporters, much of the public was not buying
the result.
In summary. the Wagner Act scores high on the goal of equalizing bargaining power.
With respect to the key goal of industrial peace. however, the Wagner Act was not a
success. Strikes did become less violent compared to the strikes of the late 1 9th century,
but violence was still a frequent feature of strike activity. In addition the level of strike
activity increased dramatically, and this. combined with the continuing incidence of vio
lence. was eventually deemed to be unacceptable. Whatever its success in promoting the
bargaining power of workers, it was doomed to be replaced because it failed to achieve
industrial peace.
C.

Did the Taft-Hartley Amendments Achieve the Goals of the NLRA?

The Taft-Hartley Amendments transformed the original Wagner Act into a very dif
ferent regime. It certainly changed the Wagner Act's balance between employers and
union in favor of employers. It also supported the development of a vibrant non-union
sector in almost every industry, thus raising the likelihood of direct product market com
petition between union and non-union companies vying to sell to the same customers.
With respect to the goal of industrial strife. the post-Taft- Hartley N L RA has been
much more successful than the Wagner Act. While the Wagner Act had some success
in reducing the level of violence and the political threat associated with strike activity,
highly disruptive strikes continued in large numbers and the state of labor-management
relations during World War I I was an especially sorry story. The labor relations prob
lems of World War I I , however, were not repeated during the Korean War, which fol
lowed the passage of Taft-Hartley. Indeed, after Taft-Harley, violent strikes and the need
for federal troop intervention finally disappeared.
Table 1 5 .3 includes two strike activity calculations. In column 2, the average annual
number of strikes is presented. Although informative, focusing on the number of strikes
over an extended period of time can be misleading. The United States economy boomed
after World War II and the growth in the economy, both in terms of output and in the
size of the labor force, continued with only brief interruptions, at least until the last few
years. In terms of its economic effect, even an unchanging number of strikes meant a
lessening of industrial strife and that is what the data show.
As shown in Table 1 5 .3, which provides decade averages in the number of strikes. the
absolute number of strikes declined very slowly after the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act.
(Note that the data are for strikes involving over 1 ,000 workers. This series is presented
because the Bureau of Labor Statistics stopped collecting the number of all strikes with
less than 1 .000 workers in 1 98 1 .) The decline in the number of strikes, adjusted for the
size of the economy, is more gradual and continuous.
A factor that stands out i n the unadjusted strike activity data is the apparent effect
of the election of Ronald Reagan in 1 9 8 1 and the subsequent firing of the air traffic
controllers for engaging in an illegal strike on August 3, 198 1 Y Specifically, while the
average number of strikes during the 1 970s was roughly 289 per year, this same figure
was roughly 83 during the 1 980s. Since 2000, the average number of strikes per year
has been around 20. But attributing the success of the Taft-Hartley Act in reducing
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Table 1 5 . 3

/em

A verage number o..f strikes ( involving 1 , 000 or more H·orkers) by decade
Average N u mber of Strikes

Decade

Average N umber of Strikes (Unadj usted)

(Adjusted to 1 947 Employment)

1 94 7-59

330.3

3 1 0.2

1 960-69

282.9

225 . 1

1 970-79

288.8

1 9 1 .0

1 980-89

83.1

45.7

1 990-99

34.7

1 6.0

2000-09

20. 1

8.2

Notes:

This table was calculated from BLS statistics ( 1 947-2009 ) . The data were reported as strikes

involving l ,000 or more workers. The number of strikes was averaged over relevant periods in column 2.
Column 3 shows average number of strikes adjusted to 1 947 employment. This column w a s created by
using 1 947 employment as a base and then dividing the number of strikes by employment for the given year
adjusted to the base of 1 94 7 .

industrial strife to Ronald Reagan's action some 33 years after the passage of the Act
is far too simplistic. After all, there was never a question as to the authority to replace
workers who were striking unlawfully. What changed were the social norms of labor
relations.
The election of Ronald Reagan, like the passage of Taft-Hartley, speaks to the chang
ing mood of the electorate toward strikes. The effect of that election and especially of
the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) fi rings was immediate
and jarring for existing unions and their strategies. The decision emboldened employers
to make more use of the economic weapons available to them under the N LRA, particu
larly the right to permanently replace striking workers after impasse is reached in the
midst of a strike.44
What accounts for the success of Taft-Hartley in reducing industrial strife, fo llowing
the failure of the Wagner Act to achieve the goal? One of the theses of this chapter is that
a key underlying factor - and this is indeed attributable to Taft-Hartley - is the growth
of the non-union sector. One of the distinguishing differences between the Wagner Act
and the Taft-Hartley Act is that the former took an activist pro-union stance, while the
latter switched to a neutral position. While the former envisioned a country where most
workers would belong to unions, the latter did not. It was the Taft-Hartley vision that
won out. While the Un ited States economy was booming, with a few recessions but no
depressions, virtually all of the growth occurred in the non-union sector. Even without
the Reagan effect, industrial peace would have been achieved.
Non-union companies became a factor in nearly every industry. Mounting a cos.tly
strike in a unionized plant or firm carried a much higher probability that the effect of
any resolution of the strike would be a loss of union employment. H igher labor costs and
disruptions in the supply of any particular good or activity made it all the more likely
that the buyer would switch to a non-union competitor who had lower costs and where
disruptions due to strikes were extremely unlikely. The higher probability of losing a
strike decreased the incidence of its use by unions.
The growth of the non-union labor force takes us back to the second goal of the
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Wagner Act and my thesis that the goals are in conflict with each other. While indus
trial peace was tinally being achieved. the gains in the equalization of bargaining power
were being undone. The data on union density are shown in Table 1 5 .2. I n 1 947. the
year which marked the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, union density almost reaches
a peak. Union density plateaus around this level through the Korean War ( 1 950-53).
After the Korean War period, a steady decline sets in. As of 20 I 0, union employment as
a proportion of total private sector employment is 6.9 percent.
In summary, the Taft-Hartley legal regime achieved the goal of industrial peace, but
not the goal of union representation. With the Wagner Act, industrial strife increased
rather than declined, but union representation grew strongly as well. This is reversed
under the Taft-Hartley legal regime. I ndust rial peace is achieved. but not the equal
ization of bargaining power. Instead. a vibrant union sector is replaced by a vibrant
non-union sector.
D.

Does the Non-Union Sector Achie,'e the Goals of the NLRA'?

In analyzing the success of the N LRA as amended by Taft-Hartley. one needs to address
the non-union sector as well as the union sector. As noted above. a key development in
the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act was that the regulators moved from a one-sided goal
of encouraging unionization and collective bargaining to one of neutrality, allowing the
non-union sector to blossom. Consequently, we are interested not only in the effects o f
the legislation on the union sector; we also want to evaluate i ts effects o n the vitality or
the non-union sector.
The short answer to the question of whether the non-union sector achieves the goals
of the N LRA would seem to be "no," at least with respect to inequality of bargain
ing power. Certainly the non-union sector is one where employers unilaterally set pay
and working conditions. There is no explicit collective action involving employers and
employees. If equalization of bargaining power is equated with collective bargaining.
then the answer is definitional: the non-union sector has failed in the goal of equalization
of bargaining power.
Is there a longer answer that affords the non-union sector more credit for fu !filling
the public policy of the Wagner Act? There is, and, perhaps ironically, it makes the
non-union sector one of the great success stories of the N LRA. The longer answer starts
by recognizing the importance of peace; it ends by questioning whether non-union
employees truly lack bargaining power.
With respect to industrial peace, the non-union sector in the decades prior to the
passage of the NLRA was frequently a dysfunctional labor market, particularly during
recessions and depressions. Remember that the industrial strife and unrest that is docu
mented above occurred in the non-union sector. largely among employers that refused
to cross over into the union sector and bargain with their employees' representatives.
From a historical perspective, the episodes of violent strikes in non-union plants made
that sector a n incubator of industrial strife and unrest. Clearly, in those instances the so
called self-enforcing norms of the non-union sector, elaborated above, were not actually
self-enforcing.
The non-union employment relationship is no longer a source of industrial strife.
Employees are apparently not so frustrated by their inability to organize a union and
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get employer recognition that they take to the streets, which they did in large numbers
before the Wagner Act.
What has changed? One obvious answer is that the non-union worker can now trigger
the union option if the employer proves untrustworthy. Employees have a legal right to
organize whenever they choose to do so.45 The threat of unionization is a powerful one .
By replacing the non-judicially enforceable norms of the individual employment rela
tionship with a collective bargaining agreement, unionization significantly increases the
transaction costs of the firm. Replacing market wages with the significantly higher union
wages and benefits reduces the competitiveness of the non-union firm. Consequently, the
threat to unionize is a powerful deterrent that has likely caused the non-union employer
to act in a more trustworthy manner, living up to the accepted norms of the workplace.
However, the threat effect of unionization cannot be the entire story, especially as union
density in many sectors of the labor market approaches zero.
The employment relations practices of non-union firms have also likely improved
over time. Self-govern ing norms take time to develop and to be tested for effectiveness.
In the wake of the decline in union density. a consulting industry has been established
which can give employers either an off-the-shelf set of norms or norms targeted to their
specific employment relationship. Those norms are embodied in employee handbooks
as well as much of modern human resources ( H R ) practice. Since labor costs are such a
large component of total costs, the efficiency of the non-union employment relationship
is big business.
With respect to the equality of bargaining power, the non-union sector lacks the col
lective bargaining apparatus, but it can make other claims to satisfy some aspects of the
second goal of the N L RA. As noted above, the language of the Wagner Act points to
..
the · 'stabilization of competitive wage rates . There is little doubt among economists
that the U n ited States labor market is highly competitive, with the exception that wages
are downwardly rigid during recessions. Although this rigidity appears to be in conflict
with the idea of the market being highly competitive, downward wage rigidity serves a
separate competitive purpose; namely it is a component of self-enforcing norms in the
non-union sector ( Wachter. Chapter 2 in this volume). The United States economy has
gone through a number of recessions since the Great Depression, yet no one has made
the 1 930s ' claim that the downturn in the economy 'vvas due to depressed wages result
ing from an absence of collective bargaining. Non-union workers may not act in concert
or articulate their preferences through a participatory process; but the need to act in
concert - at least to achieve the goal of wage stabilization - is not needed in today's
competitive labor markets. The non-union sector does have a governance structure in the
form of the self-enforcing norms that constrain management. Self-enforcing norms work
silently. through the invisible hand, as it were, in terms o f their adoption and retention.
Although there is no formal ' · offer/acceptance'' process, employees show constructive
acceptance when they consent to employment and then do not quit with knowledge of
workplace norms. Quit rates, in the form of workers voluntarily leaving an employer,
are highly concentrated in the first few years of employment . This suggests that workers
do search and reject jobs that they do not like. Similarly. employers show adherence to
workplace norms when they respect them. even though it is costly to them in the short
run. Moreover, there is evidence that the norms of the non-union workplace do change
over time i n a way that ref1ects changes in social norms.
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CONCLUSION: THE SUCCESSES OF THE NLRA

I return to the original question raised in this chapter: has the N LR A as it now stands
been successful in achieving the goals of the original Wagner Act? According to my anal
ysis, the N LRA has been strikingly successful in achieving its explicit legislative goals.
I t has not been completely successful because the Wagner Act's second goal of higher
union wages and higher union employment is internally inconsistent in the competitive
labor market of the United States: it is not possible both to increase union employment
and to increase wages in the union sector above competitive levels.
My positive assessment of the N L R A rests in part on the notion that the overrid
ing goal of the Wagner Act was really to achieve industrial peace. It is illegitimate as a
matter of national policy and deeply destabilizing to the social order to shoot striking
workers as regularly occurred during the decades of industrial strife. The N LRA. as
amended by Taft-Hartley, solved the problem of industrial warfare by creating a legal
ized regime of union representation elections and a legalized strike weapon that has been
choreographed into a peaceful series of steps between the union and the employer.
Once the Taft-Hartley Act shifted the N L R A from being proactively pro-union to
being neutral, however, the embedded conflict in the goals of the N LRA emerged as an
insurmountable hurdle. While the Act favored higher pay, it also supported competition
between the union and non-union employment alternatives. By favoring the substan
tive goal of above-market wages, the union sector has largely priced itself out of the
competitive labor marketplace.
Critical to the success of the NLR A is the transformation of the non-union sector
from a dysfunctional labor relations system that was an incubator for riots and violence
into one in which employees can trust the employer most of the time to enforce the
norms of the workplace. The N L R A gets a lot o f the credit for the transformation of
the non-union sector, however unfortunate and certainly ironic this may be. As long as
employees can exercise their inalienable N L R A rights to organize and bargain collec
tively, the non-union employer has to play fair. The cost of employer opportunism is too
high; namely that the profitable company will have to engage in inefficient bargaining,
write an enforceable employment contract that introduces rigidities and, in addition, pay
higher wages and benefits than the non-union competitor.
I n a very real sense, the union sector is a victim of the success of the N LRA in achiev
ing industrial peace and incentivizing the emergence of a viable non-union employment
relationship. Although a goal of the N L R A was to create a vibrant union sector, it seems
to have created a vibrant non-union sector instead. Whether from the threat of union
ization or simply the realization that acting opportunistically toward one's workforce is
unproductive, the non-union sector has emerged as a central component of the N LRA's
striking success.
Could a different system have worked better in generating high union employment
and industrial peace? The Un ited States tried one of the legal regimes that would have
made it all work. corporatism as developed in the N I RA . In the corporatist regime, all
workers could be unionized - or at least covered by the major economic terms of union
agreements. That would secure both the procedural and substantive elements of the
equalization of bargaining power. The workers could bargain collectively at the firm
level and their national or federation union would have a seat at the highest level of
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policymaking, thus securing industrial peace. But that was not the choice that Roosevelt
and the American voters made.

NOTES
I.

The author gratefully acknowledges the contribution of the criticisms and suggestions made b y Cynthia
Estlund, Sarah Gordon, Barry Hirsch, Sophia Lee and Howard Lesnick. The author also thanks Natalie

1.
3.

DiTomasso, Sarah Edelson. Marisa Kirio and Conor McNally for research assistance.
Hirsch and Macpherson ( 2 0 1 1 ) report that less than 8 percent o f private sector workers belong to
unions.
This is from the preamble to the NLRA. 29 U . S . C . § 1 5 1 (2006): ·'The denial by some employers o f the
right of employees t o organize and the refusal b y some employers to accept the procedure o f collective
bargaining lead to strikes and other forms o f industrial strife o r unrest, which have the intent o r the neces
sary effect o f burdening o r obstructing commerce

4.

.

. . . ··

This i s from the preamble t o t h e NLRA, "The inequality o f bargaining power between employees who d o
n o t possess full freedom of association or actual liberty o f contract, a n d employers w h o a r e organized i n
t h e corporate o r other forms o f ownership association substantially burdens and affects t h e flow of com
merce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions, by depressing wage rates and the purchas
ing power of wage earners in industry and by preventing the stabilization o f competitive wage rates and
working conditions within and between industries.··

5.
6.

See Wachter (Chapter 2 i n this volume) for a discussion o f the ILM and the features that distinguish i t
from the E L M .
NLRB

v.

Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 3 0 I U . S . I ( 1 937) ("[T)he fact remains that the stoppage o f those

operations by industrial strife would have a most serious effect upon interstate commerce. In view of
respondent's far-flung activities, it is idle to say that the effect would be indirect o r remote. It is obvious
that it would be immediate and might be catastrophic."").
7.

Many states, maybe even most, recognized some right to strike. B u t even in those that did, the federal
courts could enjoin strike activity under the ·'general common law·· and their own version of ··equity ...

8.

both i n formed by a broad ·'liberty o f contract.""
See Forbath ( l 99 l ) for a more detailed discussion o n labor injunctions.

9.

Zinn (2003. p . 25 1 ) : ("When t h e great railroad strikes o f 1 8 7 7 were over, a hundred people were dead, a
thousand people had gone to j a i l , I 00,000 workers had gone on strike, and the strikes had roused into
action countless unemployed in the cities. More than half the freight on the nation·s 75.000 miles o f track
had stopped running at the height o f the strikes.").

10.

II.

This i s from the preamble t o t h e National Labor Relations Act. 2 9 U . S . C . § 1 5 1 (1006).
78 CO:"G. REC 3678 . 3679 ( 1 9 34) (statement of Senator Wagner) ("The primary requirement for coop

eration is that employers �md employees should possess equality of bargaining power. The only way to
accomplish this i s by securing for employees the full right to act collectively through representatives o f

their own choosing . . . . The fathers o f our Nation did not regard freedom o f con tract a s a n abstract end.
They valued it as a means o f insuring equal opportunities. which cannot be attained where contracts are
12.

dictated by the stronger party.").
The union wage premium over the last 90 years has been calculated to be around 2 0 percent. The work o f
Lewis ( 1 963) is regarded a s a u t h oritative fo r the first half o f the 20th century u p until the 1970s. Pen cave!
and Hartsog ( I 984) agreed with Lewis"s findings and placed the premium somewhere between 1 8 and 16
percent for the period from 1 920-80. More recently. Hirsch and Macpherson (20 l l ) show the premium
to hover right around 20 percent since 1 97 3 . There has. however, been a decline in the premium in recent

13.

years.
Commons and Andrews· support for this claim was meager. citing t o Tawney's ( 1 9 1 5 ) study o f the tailor
ing i n d ustry that concluded. "as a rule. the girls work better if they are paid more."· See also Ernst ( 1 993)
for an intellectual history o f the Commons school and the economic theories it relied on.

14.
1 5.

Hicks was 2 8 years old when h e published The

Theory uf IVages.

Since h e was not well established u n t i l

h i s influential Value and Capital, published in 1 939, his ideas spread slowly.

But see Est lund ( 1 993, p. 973) (The theory of ··underconsumption ·· or · 'mass purchasing power . .. which
underlay much o f the New Deal program, was featured prominently in the Act's preamble. and was

16.

repeatedly invoked by the Act's key supporters).
T o Senator Wagner. workers· participation in collective bargaining was more important than achieving

17.

See Summers, Wellington a n d Hyde ( 1 9 82) (Enacted i n 1 93 2 . the Norris-L a Guardia Act put serious

the substantive goal o f higher wages. See Barenberg ( 1 9 9 3 ).
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restrictions on the federal courts' ability to grant labor injunctions, made yel l ow-dog contracts i l l egaL

and acknowled ged the right of workers to engage in concerted activities. Section 4 of t h e Act prohibits
injunctions against peaceful union activities such as st riking or pic ke ting. Section 7 o f the Act goes o n to

further limit the issuance o f such injunct ions to instances where for examp le ·· substantial and irreparable
i nj ury ·· will occur to plaintiffs property and the "complaint has no adequ ate remedy at law . .. ). See a l so
Frankfurter and Greene ( 1 930).

18.

O f 8 5 seizures from the Civil War period to the st e el seizure o f 1 9 5 2 . inclusive, only 1 8 o r 1 9 appear t o
have been undertaken for reasons havin g nothing t o do with labor disputes. See Kleiler ( 1 95 3 ) (refere nc
ing Appendix 1 1 attached to Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Youngstown Sheet and Tu be Co. v. Sawyer.
343 U . S . 579 ( 1 9 5 2 ) ) .

19.
20.

Court settlements. however. peaked i n 1 94 1 . Perhaps this indicates a shift in tactics b y the Roosevelt

administration as l abor- management d i sput es affected d e fense prod uc t ion .

However. the National Guard was summoned for assistance twice during the year of 1 970. They were
first called in during the 1 970 postal strike \\'hen the president declared a national emergency and sum
moned both the National Guard and the U . S . Army to del i ver vital pieces of m ai l that. i f n ot deliYered.
threatened to cripple l a rge businesses. Troops we re called in aga in during the 1 970 Teamsters wildcat
strike. The unauthorized strike quickly spread across the country. Violence broke out in Ohio. forcing the

go\'ernor to call i n 4 . 1 00 mem bers of the Nationa l Guard to control the rioting crowds and rock-hurling
strikers. The strike continued for 12 wee k s and concluded with a union victory. See Brec her ( 1 997. pp.
21.

273-6).
Economic prospe ri ty allowed labor to tend to its already organized industrial and craft base and gain
higher wages and benefits. The reduction in n ew organizi n g in the private sector meant that unions were
limiting their influence to the sectors that had a l ready been un ionized . Co nseq ue n tly . unionization \\'Ould
not become a national movement.

22.

23.
24.

The goal of "fair competiti on " was featured in the pream b le of the Natio nal In dustria l Recovery Act of

1 933, ch. 90. 48 Stat. 195 ("To encourage national industrial recovery. to foster fa ir compe tition. and to
.
prov id e for the construction of certain useful p u bl ic works, and for oth e r purposes. . ) . Section 3 of the Act
..
provid es for "Codes of Fair Com peti t ion .
William Green. presi de nt o f the AFL. credited Section 7 ( a ) with adding 1 . 5 million new union mem bers,

a more than o ne-third increase. by the time of t he October 1 933 convention. See Eisner (1000).
Note Section 7(b) permitted the establishment of s t a n dard s regarding maximum hours of labor. minimum
rates of pay an d wo rk ing conditions in the industries covered by the codes, while Section 7(c) authorized

25.

the presid en t to impose such standards on codes whe n vol u n t ary agreement could not be reached .
Section 7(a) states. ·'[E)mployees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively through repre

sentatives of t heir own choos i ng, and shall be free from the interference. restraint. or coercio n of employ

ers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such representatives or in self-organization or in other
concerted activities fo r the purpose of collective ba rga i ning or other mutual aid or protection: [and) (2)
that no employee and no one seek ing employment shall be requ ired as a condition of employment to join

any company union or t o refrain from joining, organ izin g, or ass ist ng a labor organization of his own
..
choosi ng . . . .
The change from the N I R A to the N LRA a nd the early days of the Nation al Labor Relations Board are
i

26.

described in great detail in Gross ( 1 974). G ross's work on the NLRB remains th e premier discussion of

these issues.
27.

28.

National Labor Relatio ns Act, 29 U.S.C. § ! 5 7

(2006).

B ut did Section 7 trump existing state laws and protect all peaceful union activi t y. inclu d ing secondary
activity? Almost certainly not. When challenged on the ·'one-sidedness" of the Wagner Act. proponents
said several times that there was no need to create unfair labor practi ces sin ce state law al re a d y regu l ated
union activity. So the Board and the courts would have had to figure out just how fa r Section 7 protected
activity that was restricted b y state Jaw. We ca n be quite sure that Section 7 would not have protecte d all
non-violent concerted activit y. But that interpretive process was cut short by the re l ati vely quick enact·

ment of Taft- Hart ley, which itself regulated union activity. Subsequently. the Supreme Court concluded

29.
30.

that Congress had occupied the field of labor relations and preempted state regu lation . except for violent
events. For a compe ll in g discussion of this issue. see Estlund (2002).
Barenberg ( 1 99 3 ) makes this point most strongly .
An alternative argument that used to be po pul ar and is still included in textbook treatments of the labor
market is t he monopsony model. The claim is that firms have monopsony power i n labo r markets . I f firms

can exercise market power in setting wages. t h ey can set the wage below com peti t ive levels. The result is

higher profits but at the cost of below com peti ti ve wages an d employment levels. In this set t i ng. the union
arrives as a rescue r of both the empl oyee and society. The union can raise the wage to competit ive levels.
thereby offseuing the fim1's m on opsony power. Moreover. in doing so, the union leads the parties 10 t he
competitive result \\'here employment increases as well as wages. Unfortunately. I am not aware of any
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literature that makes a serious claim that the labor market. outside of a few isolated pockets, is marked
by monopsony power that can be exercised by fin11S.

31.

For a discussion o f a secondary boycott. see Frankfurter and Greene ( 19.30).

31.

Closed shop is different from what became known as the ·'union shop."' Under the ··tmion shop."' which
was permitted by Taft-Hartley as long as state law allowed it. an employee once hired by the employer

33.

was required to join the union.
B u t see Gross ( 1 9 9 5 ) (''Taft and his supporters i n the Senate argued that the conference committee bill
left undisturbed the act's essen tial theory that [in Taft's words) ·The solution of the labor problem i n the
United States is free, collective bargaining." Whatever the merits of Taft's claim . . . [t]he majority of the
House did not intend to promote collective bargaining as the solution to labor problems. Their state
ment of policy, not only in its omission of any reference to collective bargaining but also in its historical
.
context, was intended at least to weaken. and possibly eliminate, collective bargaining . ).
·'Open shop" is a system that Taft-Hartley did not mandate but does permit states to mandate. Outside
.

34.

22 right-to-work states. unions can negotiate for a ·'union shop" b y which employees have to join (or
now pay an agency fee) within 30 days of starting work.
the

35.
36.

See also Hirsch's contribution to this volume.
A virtue of focusing o n the globalization point is that it takes away any onus that may have been placed

in the above analysis. If the competition is only within the United States, then the unionized firms that
lose market share are less likely to find political support. If union workers in Michigan receive higher

wages than non-union workers i n North Carolina. where they are doing comparable levels of work,
then it is easy to make a normative argument to support the competitive markets that lead to work
leaving Michigan to go to North Carolina. If the work is migrating to lower wage firms in China. or now
Vietnam, then the normative story is different. Almost no one would favor United States wage levels to
fall to the level in the Chinese market. Hence. if the competitive advantage arises from the low wage level
in China, then a policy argument to protect American workers from such competition is easier to make
(at least to American voters). On the other hand. almost no one would favor building in constraints that
would prevent jobs from migrating from M ichigan to North Carolina. Yes. the migration benefits one
group of American workers over another group of American workers. Bttt if both groups of workers are
doing the same work. then it is unclear why government policy should favor one group over another. For
a detailed discussion of this issue, see Cowie
37.

(1001 ).

There i s a contract. of course. even if it's terminable at will. a n d even if its terms can b e altered at will by
the employer prospectively. The contract provides for a specific wage or salary. certain job d uties, etc ..
all subject to change by the employer. It may have almost n o prospective impact. but as to work that has
been done. the contract governs. Most non-union. non-managerial employees probably work under a

38 .
39.

-!0.
41.

42.

-!3.

contract that is expressly terminable at will. by the terms of an employee handbook or other document
that many courts are willing to give legal effect.
Referring to a " crisis in compliance " by fall of 1 9.33.
See Brand ( 1 988 . p. 94 ) (noting that the Depression did not elicit the "level of virtuous self-restraint"
necessary for N I RA compliance).

See Dulles ( 1 960. pp. '27 1 -1) ( describing the precipitous increase i n strikes under Nl R A as workers fo ught
for higher wages and union recogn ition).

As mentioned above. Pencavel and Hartsog ( 1 984) confirmed Lewis's ( 196.3) findings and placed the
premium between 1 8 and 16 percent for the period of 1 920-80. Hirsch and Macpherson · s ( 10 1 1 ) d at a
show that the wage premium has typically been between

1 5 and

10 percent since 1 9 7 3 .

Although t h e number of strikes increased between the Wagner A c t period a n d t h e Taft-Hartley period.
the percentage increase in strikes decreased dramatically. Additionally. the number of strikes adjusted for
the size of the labor force had declined.
The Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) went on strike on August 3. 1 98 1 .
seeking better working conditions and a shorter workweek. As a government union. PATCO violated 5
U.S.C. § 7 3 1 1 , which prohibits government unions from striking. Historically. the government had been
lax in punishing violations of this law. so it was surprising when President Reagan used it to order the
strikers back to work within 48 hours of the announcement of the strike. The public was supportive of
Reagan's tactics because the strike seemed to lack moral content; " the salaries and working conditions
of the strikers scarcely generated sympathy among a public conscious of high levels of inflation and
unemployment" and "the strikers had not only defied the law but also. as constantly emphasized by the
Administration. had broken their oath." See Meltzer and Sunstein ( 1 983, p . 760) ( referencing Gallup
polls as well as editorials from the major newspapers).

44.

The battle between the UA W and Caterpillar is a primary example. See Corbett ( 1994. p. 811) and Bearak
( 1 995).

45.

There i s considerable debate on the q uestion a s t o whether t h e legal right t o organize i s fully effective. See.
fo r just two examples. Weiler ( 1 990) and Gould ( 1 996).
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